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Abstract—Today, Internet of Things (IoT) technology is being
increasingly popular which is applied in a wide range of
industry sectors such as healthcare, transportation and some
critical infrastructures. With the widespread applications of IoT
technology, people’s lives have changed dramatically. Due to
its capabilities of sensitive data-aware, information collection,
communication and processing, it raises security and privacy
concerns. Moreover, a malicious attacker may impersonate a
legitimate user, which may cause security threat and viola-
tion privacy. In allusion to the above problems, we propose
a novel and lightweight anonymous authentication and key
agreement scheme for heterogeneous IoT, which is innovatively
designed to shift between the public key infrastructure (PKI) and
certificateless cryptography (CLC) environment. The proposed
scheme not only achieves secure communication among the
legal authorized users, but also possesses more attributes with
user anonymity, non-repudiation and key agreement fairness.
Through the security analysis, it is proved that the proposed
scheme can resist replay attacks and denial of service (DOS)
attacks. Finally, the performance evaluation demonstrates that
our scheme is more lightweight and innovative.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of modern smart technolo-
gies, Internet of things (IoT) has caught much attention
from industry and IT community in terms of networking
and communication aspects [1]. In the future, IoT commu-
nication scenarios will be a combination of heterogeneous
access technologies and services, which enables users to be
exposed to a diverse network environment. The heterogeneity
of IoT determines that information can flow among multiple
transmission networks with different structures, providing
various services on a common network platform. Like in
all other communication and computer networks, security
issues are always significantly important in the development
of heterogeneous IoT (HIoT). In addition, key agreement
and authentication mechanism play indispensable roles in the
aspects of protecting user privacy and data security for HIoT
scenario.
IoT is a popular notion [2] that has been widely used in in-
dustries such as healthcare and some critical infrastructures, as
shown in Fig.1. Meanwhile, the diversity of IoT applications
and heterogeneity of IoT communication infrastructures also
have led to lots of security challenges [3–12], exposing some
threats of malicious attacks, data interception, user privacy
leaking, unauthorized access, etc. These security flaws seri-
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Fig. 1: Application Scenario of IoT
ously affect HIoT’s development and application. Therefore,
security and privacy become essential in HIoT.
In 2010, the EU Commission [13] identified security and
privacy as a major IoT research challenge. Many researches
[14–17] focused on secure communication and privacy preser-
vation for HIoT. Moreover, some other researches [18–21]
put forward countermeasures that were targeted at specific
types of attacks. In 2017, Feng et al. [18] presented a
replay-attack resistant authentication scheme, based on an
improved challenge-response mechanism instead of the times-
tamp mechanism. In [19], a lightweight defensive algorithm
for distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS) was proposed
for IoT environment, which could protect the sensor nodes
from the attacks of malicious requests effectively. In order to
preserve user privacy, Kim-Kim’s scheme [20] adopted the
one-time pseudonym identities synchronization mechanism
that could maintain identities consistency between users and
the server. However, the scheme was vulnerable to the de-
synchronization attack. In 2015, Wang et al. [21] improved the
Kim-Kim’s scheme, achieving superior privacy preservation.
Authentication and key agreement are the core technologies
and the foundation of other security mechanisms. It enables
legal authorized users to establish a reliable relationship
between each other in HIoT. In 2009, a key establishment and
authentication scheme based on combined public key (CPK)
algorithm was proposed for the heterogeneous network, and
it was proved to be efficient in terms of the mutual authen-
tication [22]. In 2013, Chu et al. [23] proposed an identity
authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptographic
(ECC), which innovatively used the encryption algorithm of
public-private key pair to satisfy the security requirements
of heterogeneous network. In 2016, Amin et al. [24] came
up with a three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme
for IoT and claimed that their scheme was secure. However,
Arasteh et al. [25] showed that the scheme of Amin et al. was
prone to replay attacks and DOS attacks.
Moreover, due to the resource-constrained nature of IoT
devices, the secure schemes should be lightweight. In allusion
to this requirement, some schemes [26, 27] were proposed to
reduce the computation burden of participants. In 2016, Iqbal
and Bayoumi [28] proposed a novel authentication and key
agreement scheme, which offloaded the heavy cryptographic
functions of resource-constrained sensors to the trusted neigh-
boring sensors. In [29], a secure and lightweight mutual
authentication and key agreement scheme was presented, in
which the cryptographic functions were proved to be computa-
tionally lightweight and resist some known attacks. Although
these schemes were lightweight in the IoT environment, they
did not prove that they were applicable to heterogeneous
IoT. In [30], Hou et al. proposed a secure and lightweight
authentication and key agreement scheme based on CPK and
ECC in HIoT environment. Unfortunately, this scheme used
signature-to-encryption in a time-consuming way.
In this paper, we propose a novel and lightweight anony-
mous authentication and key agreement scheme for hetero-
geneous IoT, which is based on a signcryption algorithm
between PKI and CLC environment. It provides more features
of user anonymity, non-repudiation, key agreement fairness
and lightweight. In addition, our scheme can be proved to
resist replay attacks and DOS attacks. Therefore, it has wider
application prospect in HIoT environment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss the secure HIoT’s system model. Section III
demonstrates the proposed mutual authentication and key
agreement scheme for HIoT. Sections IV and V present
informal security and performance analysis respectively. At
last, the conclusion is described in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, there is a brief description of the HIoT’s
system model and security assumptions.
A. System model
A typical scenario model of HIoT is illustrated in Fig. 2.
It mainly consists of a gateway node (GWN), a user and a
sensor node (SN).
The GWN is a trust third party that can distribute partial
private key to the SN and the digital certificate to the user
respectively. The SN in CLC is in charge of gathering data
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Fig. 2: A secure system model for HIoT
from environments and forwarding the data to the user in PKI
via a secure channel.
B. Security assumptions
The security of the proposed scheme depends on the hard-
ness of the following problems:
G1 is a cyclic additive group, and G2 is a cyclic multiplica-
tive group. A large prime q is the order of G1, G2. e(., .) is
a bilinear map G1 × G1 → G2. P is a generator of G1 and
g = e(P, P ).
Definition 1 (CDHP). Defining Computational Diffie-
Hellman Problem (CDHP) is to compute abP ∈ G1 when
given (P, aP, bP ) ∈ G1.
Definition 2 (ECDLP). Defining Elliptic Curve Discrete Log-
arithm Problem (ECDLP) is to compute the integer a ∈ Z∗q
when given (P, aP ) ∈ G1.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we propose a novel anonymous authenti-
cation and key agreement scheme based on a signcryption
algorithm for HIoT, as shown in Fig. 3. The proposed scheme
comprises three phases: system initialization, system registra-
tion, system authentication and key agreement phase.
A. System initialization phase.
1) The GWN selects the main private key s ∈ Z∗q randomly,
and calculates the public key Ppub = sP . Let l be the security
parameter of the system and ID = {0, 1}∗ be an identity
space.
2) The GWN defines five secure cryptographic hash func-
tions: H0 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q , H1 : {0, 1}
∗ × G1 → Z
∗
q ,
H3 : {0, 1}
n ×G1 → Z
∗
q , H4 : {0, 1}
n → Z∗q . Then, it pub-
lishes parameter{G1, G2, P, Ppub, l, g,H0, H1, H2, H3, H4}
and keeps s.
B. System registration phase.
This phase is divided into two steps: registration between
the user and the GWN, registration between the SN and the
GWN.
Step 1: Registration between the user in PKI environment
and the GWN.
1) The user runs PKI-Key-Gen algorithm:
• Select xp ∈ Z
∗
q randomly as the private key skp = xp;
• Compute Ppub = xpP as its public key;
• Send the message {IDp, PKp} to the GWN through a
secure channel.
2) The GWN firstly computes the account information
Acd = (w1+H0(IDp))P and the signature information σ1 =
w1+H0(IDp)+sδ, where w1 ∈ Z
∗
q and δ = H1(IDp, PKp).
Then, it returns the identity account management information
{Acd, σ1, δ} to the user.
3) The user checks if the equation Acd = σ1P − Ppubδ
holds or not.
• If it holds, the user stores {Acd, σ1, δ}, and regards Acd
as its identifier, which indicates the registration between
the GWN and the user is successful;
• Otherwise, the user aborts.
Step 2: Registration between the SN in CLC environment and
the GWN.
1) The SN sends its identity IDc to the GWN.
2) The GWN runs CLC-Partial-Private-Key-Gene algo-
rithm:
• Select t ∈ Z∗q randomly, compute T = tP , γ =
H1(IDc, T ) and obtain part of the private key d = t+sγ;
• Return {T, d, γ} to the SN through a secure channel.
3) The SN checks if e(dP, P ) = e(T, P )e(Ppub, γP ) holds
or not.
• If it holds, the GWN is legal. Then, the SN selects xc ∈
Z∗q and obtains the intact privacy key skc = {xc, d};
• Otherwise, the SN aborts.
4) The SN computes PKc1 = xcP and sets PKc =
{T, PKc1, γ} as its intact public key. Then, it checks if
Acd = σ1P − Ppubδ.
• If it holds, the SN stores {Acd, σ1, PKp, δ}, and regards
Acd as legal user’s identifier;
• Otherwise, the SN aborts.
C. System authentication and key agreement phase.
1) The user runs the PKI-to-CLC heterogeneous signcryp-
tion algorithm:
• Select a random number k ∈ {0, 1}n;
• Compute r = H2(k,m), R1 = rP , r1 = m ⊕ H3(k),
r2 = k ⊕H3(r1);
• Compute U = rPKc1 + T + γPpub;
• Compute c = (skpH4(m) + r) (mod n);
• Obtain the ciphertext message σ = {c, R1, r1, r2, U};
• Calculate the account protection information R2 = R1+
Acd;
• Send a service request message {R2, σ, tc} to the SN.
2) Then, the SN runs the PKI-to-CLC heterogeneous un-
signcryption algorithm:
• Check if |tc − t1| < ∆t, where t1 is the current
timestamp, and ∆t is the allowed transmission delay.
If it holds, the message is fresh. The SN can carry
on the subsequent steps. Otherwise, it terminates the
authentication.
• Compute R1 =
1
xc
(U − dP );
• Compute k = r2 ⊕ H3(r1), m = r1 ⊕ H3(k), r =
H2(k,m);
• If R1 = cP−H4(m)PKp, the SN receives σ. Otherwise,
it returns ⊥ for rejection;
• Check if Acd = R2 − R1. If it does, the SN computes
its own message digest h1 = H1(IDc||tc, Acd||c). Oth-
erwise, the SN aborts;
• Calculate the session key key = H2(h1, R1);
• Calculate the message authentication code M1 =
MACkey(h1) and send M1 to the user.
3) Finally, the user does the following verification:
• Calculate the message digest h1 = H1(IDc||tc, Acd||c);
• Calculate the session key key = H2(h1, R1);
• Generate a new message authentication code M∗
1
=
MACkey(h1). And it checks if M1 = M
∗
1 . If it does,
the authentication is successful. Otherwise, it is failed.
If mutual authentication is successful, the user and the SN
could generate the same session key respectively. Therefore,
they can communicate with each other securely in the future.
IV. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Mutual authentication
The scheme realizes mutual heterogeneous authentication
between SNs and users. When a user starts the authentication
phase with a SN, the SN has to verify the identity of the user.
Thereby, it needs to verify the user’s legality by running the
authentication phase of Section III. After verifying user’s le-
gality, the user starts authenticating the SN. The user can also
verify the SN’s legality by running the authentication phase
of Section III. When the SN and the user are both proven to
be legal, they also have completed the key agreement phase.
B. Key agreement
Only the user and the SN can get the session key key =
H2(h1, R1). The user does not send the account information
Acd to the SN directly.Acd is hidden in the account protection
information R2 = R1 + Acd. If the private key of the SN
is unavailable, anyone else can not obtain Acd and h1. In
other word, it is impossible for others to get the session key.
Therefore, the session key is secure in our scheme.
C. Anonymity
Our scheme ensures the user’s anonymity via the masked
identity {IDp, PKp}. In system registration phase, the user
sends the registration request message {IDp, PKp} to the
GWN. The GWN creates an account information Acd for the
user. Here, Acd is not the real identity of the user. Namely,
it is only the user’s identifier. When the user sends a service
request message to the SN, the SN sends the corresponding
service to the user with Acd, but it does not know the real
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Fig. 3: Simplified overall architecture of our scheme
identity of the user. Because the SN can not derive the user’s
identity information from Acd. So our scheme achieves the
user’s identity anonymity in system registration phase.
In system authentication phase, Acd is not transmitted in
plaintext and is hidden by the account protection information
R2 = R1+Acd. Only the user and the SN can get Acd. Even
the GWN can not get the user’s real identity. Therefore, our
scheme can provide the user’s identity anonymity.
D. Non-repudiation
The user sends the service request message {R2, σ, tc} to
the SN, but in this process others can not forge the ciphertext
message σ without obtaining the user’s intact private key
due to the hardness of the CDHP problem under current
conditions. Thereby, σ can only be generated by the user.
When the authentication is successful, the SN will provide
the corresponding services for the legal user. The user can
not deny sending the service request messages to the SN.
Similarly, anyone else is unable to impersonate the SN due
to the lack of the SN’s private key. Therefore, the SN can
not deny either that it had received the user’s service request
messages or that it had provided the corresponding services
for the user.
E. Key agreement fairness
The SN calculates the session key key = H2(h1, R1)
and the message authentication code M1. Then it sends
M1 to the user. After receiving M1, the user calculates the
message digest h1 = H1(IDc||tc, Acd||c) in order to get
the session key key = H2(h1, R1). It computes the message
authentication code M∗1 . The SN and the user can get the
session key and the message authentication code equally, and
one participant does not have more privilege than the other.
Therefore, the communication participants are in an equal
position after the key agreement is completed. According to
the above, fairness is ensured in our scheme.
F. Anti-replay attacks
The SN is unable to identify the validity of the message
from the user, because it does not know if the message
had been received by itself. The attackers usually utilize the
drawback to initiate a replay attack on the SN. Our scheme
avoids this drawback by involving a timestamp to the user’s
service request message effectively. After receiving the service
request message, the SN can check the freshness of the
message based on the judgment of the timestamp to identify
if the message could be accepted. Therefore, our scheme can
resist replay attacks.
G. Denial of service attacks
In system registration phase, the GWN sends the account
information Acd to the user and the SN respectively through
a secure channel. When the user initiates a service request
for the SN, the SN utilizes the account protection information
R2 and own private key to compute Acd. Then, it verifies
if Acd is equal to the received Acd, so as to determine if
it should accept the service request message from the user.
Before generating a bogus service request, the attackers must
calculate Acd correctly ahead. However, they can not get
the correct Acd = (w1 + H0(IDp))P without the random
number w1. Our scheme exploits Acd to prevent attackers
from abusing system resources to send a lot of invalid service
request messages. Therefore, our scheme can resist denial of
service attacks successfully.
V. THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
For quantitative analysis of our scheme, we use Ubuntu
OS as the experimental platform to simulate the total running
time. Let P denote the bilinear pairing operation, M denote the
point multiplication operation in G1, E denote the exponential
operation in G2, and H denote the hash operation separately.
TABLE I demonstrates the performance comparison be-
tween the proposed scheme and other related schemes. Note
that SC denotes symmetric cryptography. Fig. 4 shows the
total computation and communication costs of each scheme.
From TABLE I, we can clearly find that the scheme
[17] does not involve signcryption algorithm, so it causes
higher communication costs. Although the scheme [31] has
a lower communication overhead, it is inefficient with higher
computation complexity. Furthermore, the scheme in [32] has
only proved that it satisfies confidentiality and unforgeability.
Besides, it has the key escrow issue, causing a lot of storage
space to be occupied for the resource-constrained sensor
node side. For all above, our scheme is more applicable for
heterogeneous IoT.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent time, the security and privacy issues of HIoT have
drawn much attention from all walks of life. In order to solve
these problems for HIoT, this paper proposes an anonymous
mutual authentication and key agreement scheme based on
a proper signcryption algorithm. The proposed scheme not
only possesses the features of anonymity, non-repudiation,
key agreement fairness, but also can resist replay attacks and
DOS attacks. Additionally, the scheme is highly lightweight
with lower computation and communication overhead. What’s
more, it is innovatively designed to shift between the PKI and
CLC environment. As a consequence, our scheme has a better
scalability to be more applicable for heterogeneous IoT.
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